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Abstract 
In the present paper I examine the literature on individuals' ability to accurately assess their level of understanding of texts
(termed calibration of comprehension) and discuss research on the many factors that influence calibration accuracy.  The 
calibration literature has largely revealed that individuals' assessment skills are frequently inaccurate and inflated.  These 
mismatches between assessments of performance and actual performance have important educational and real world 
implications. 
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1.  Introduction 
Psychologists have become increasingly interested in individuals' ability to evaluate ongoing comprehension 
during cognitive tasks.  One important issue frequently examined is individuals' ability to accurately calibrate their 
level of understanding of written discourse, such as that presented in essays, newspaper articles, textbooks, and 
stories (see Lin & Zabrucky, 1998). Several researchers have argued that the ability to evaluate ongoing states of 
comprehension may actually be the most critical metacognitive process in that it must precede the use of other 
components of metacognition, such as strategy use (Pintrich, 2002).  For example, if individuals are not able to 
accurately assess their understanding during and after reading, then they will be unlikely to attempt to regulate their 
comprehension through a variety of strategies such as rereading, using the surrounding context, drawing inferences, 
or seeking out additional and possibly expert information from other sources (Zabrucky & Moore, 1994). 
If individuals actually overestimate their level of understanding (which seems to be the most common error of 
assessment) they will not spend additional time reviewing or studying and will incorrectly assume that their 
comprehension "work" is complete before an adequate level of comprehension is obtained. If this is the case, their 
ability to learn will be impaired.  On the other hand, it is possible that individuals may actually underestimate their 
level of understanding (a much less common error).  If this is the case, individuals are likely to spend additional time 
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studying for an exam that they might have put to more effective use on other activities.  In the present paper I will 
discuss research examining both of these "mismatches" of assessment versus actual performance. 
Research on individuals' assessments of knowledge of text information began in earnest in the early 1980s, 
largely through the efforts of Glenberg and his colleagues (Glenberg, & Epstein, 1985; Glenberg, & Epstein, 1987; 
Glenberg, Sanocki, Epstein, & Morris, 1987; Glenberg, Wilkinson, & Epstein, 1982). These researchers developed a 
very useful paradigm that has come to be known as the calibration of comprehension paradigm (Lin & Zabrucky, 
1998).  In this paradigm, individuals are given a series of texts to read, one at a time.  Texts are typically presented 
one per page in a booklet.  Individuals are free to read each text at their own rate and are free to reread if they wish.  
After reading a particular text, individuals are asked to answer a series of questions that appear below the passage at 
the bottom of the page.  The exact working of questions depends on the particular study examined but nearly always 
include such items as asking individuals to rate their level of understanding, their ease of understanding, and their 
readiness to take a test over the material.  To assess test readiness individuals are often asked to make a prediction 
about how well they will do on the test of the material by providing an estimate of their score in terms of an 
expected percent correct or a prediction of the number of items they expect to answer correctly. 
Across several studies, Glenberg and colleagues found that college students are often quite poor at calibrating 
their comprehension of text material, and further, that students were more likely to overestimate than underestimate 
their level of comprehension and readiness to be examined over the material (Glenberg, & Epstein, 1985; Glenberg, 
& Epstein, 1987; Glenberg,et al., 1987; Glenberg, et al., 1982). Implications of these findings for students' academic 
performance are clear. If students overestimate their understanding and readiness to be examined over material, they 
will obviously be more likely to stop studying prematurely as well as perform more poorly. Glenberg et.al (1982) 
termed this commonly found undergraduate "condition", illusion of knowing. 
Since Glenberg and colleagues' pioneering work, many investigators have examined the factors that may 
influence students' calibration skills (see Lin & Zabrucky, 1998, for a review).  These factors include the nature and 
number of the assessment questions given after reading a text, the nature of the texts, and the nature of the 
processing task during reading.  Although calibration scores can be affected by a number of factors, they have 
generally found to be consistently poor across studies (Lin & Zabrucky, 1998).  Two notable exceptions of 
researchers finding much higher levels of calibration scores occurred when students were required to reread text 
material (Rawson, Dunlosky, & Thiede, 2000) or summarize text material (Thiede & Anderson, 2003) before 
assessing understanding. Thus, it does appear possible to increase students' calibration skills with critical processing 
activities and future research is needed to determine why some tasks are so much more effective than others at 
increasing calibration accuracy. 
In addition to asking students to process material in ways that may allow them better gauge their understanding, 
many investigators (e.g., Stolp & Zabrucky, 2009; Efkildes, 2008; 2009) have also suggested that it is important to 
begin to examine the factors of "self" that may contribute to calibration differences among individuals, as such 
factors have been largely ignored in the past.  These investigators have argued that although most self-factors have 
not been extensively studied, several factors (e.g. as self-efficacy, motivation, personality) may be critical but 
missing links in the calibration puzzle (see Stolp & Zabrucky, 2009). 
Most psychologists have focused on the typical educational implications of calibration skills in the lab or 
classroom (e.g., Hacker, Bol, Horgan, & Rakow, 2000).  As most of us who teach understand all too well, the 
implications of students' poor calibration skills, particularly if they fall prey to the "illusion of knowing" problem 
already discussed, clearly cause difficulties.  If students fail to calibrate their understanding of text information due 
to an overestimation of their knowledge, they will fail to study as much as they need to and will likely do poorly or 
at least less well than they could have on an exam. 
But accurate calibration skills are also crucial for individuals in the real world. Kruger and Dunning (1999; 2002) 
have been actively investigating the role of individuals' perceptions of their own abilities in the real world.  These 
investigators have concluded that most individuals experience the equivalent of Glenberg et al.'s "illusion of 
knowing" in the real world.  That is, Kruger and Dunning have argued that most adults believe that they are better 
than average with regard to their skill levels and report that individuals in many occupations (e.g., teachers) actually 
think they are more skilled than they are.  Kruger and Dunning's "better than average" effect has been widely 
examined in the real world.  Perhaps, not surprisingly, Kruger and Denning report that the effect is the strongest in 
those who are least competent for it is individuals' own incompetence that keeps them from learning from others or 
realizing what they do not know.  Their findings are actually quite similar to those found with students.  Most 
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students (and the poorest students) overestimate their test readiness.  Fewer students (and as it happens, the best 
students) underestimate their test readiness. 
Many examples of potential catastrophes in the making come to mind regarding the "illusion of knowing" and 
"above average effect" in the real world.  For example, let's consider, for a moment, an individual who has the 
responsibility of making potentially life and death decisions on a regular basis, such as an oncologist. Let us also 
suppose that you, the reader, have been given a diagnosis of cancer and that you are meeting a recommended 
oncologist for the first time.  The doctor reviews your pathology report, discusses your options and prognosis, and 
suggests a course of action.  You are, of course, very nervous about your disease, you want to believe what your 
doctor tells you, and, yet, you can't help but wonder if your doctor is knowledgeable about the most recent 
innovations and treatments for cancer. You ask your doctor, "Are you sure that is what I should be doing"?  and 
your doctor tells you, with utmost confidence, that he or she is sure.  You decide you need more certainty and go to 
a  second oncologist for a second opinion.  During this visit you find out that the second doctor would give you a 
very different course of treatment.  What do you do?  Both doctors appear knowledgeable and confident of their 
planned regimens.  Your problem is that you are not sure who is more knowledgeable, who has better metacognitive 
skills, and who (if anyone) may be experiencing an illusion of knowing. 
What you might do at this point is decide to get a third (or fourth) opinion, as well as meticulously scour the 
medical literature for more information.  At some point you will need to make a decision and decide to add a 
particular oncologist to your team of doctors. As one can easily see in this example, the consequences of illusion of 
knowing could prove detrimental to one's health or life.  There is much more at stake in this real world example than 
simply failing an exam. 
2. Conclusions 
There are many important implications of inaccurate assessments for individuals' performance and decision 
making in both educational and real world settings.  Initial research on  calibration was conducted exclusively within 
laboratory or classroom settings while more recent research has examined calibration in real world contexts,\. 
Further, investigators have recently begun to examine the role of important self-factors in calibration ability. 
Implications of inaccurate assessments can vary in severity from failing to study when needed to providing 
misleading and inaccurate information to others.  Much more research is needed on calibration in and out of 
educational settings and on improving individuals' calibration skills. 
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